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Institutions, labour management practices, and firm performance in Europe 
 
Richard Croucher and Marian Rizov  
Middlesex University Business School 
 
Abstract 
We develop a theoretical framework to examine three hypotheses on the relationship between 
LMPs and organisational performance in European firms.  The first is that collaborative 
forms are more strongly associated with superior firm performance than calculative forms.  
The second is that these associations are strongest where national institutional and normative 
settings support them.  The third is that employer-employee consultative committees and 
collective payment methods are also associated with superior firm performance.  The first 
two hypothesis are strongly empirically supported, as is the third albeit more weakly.  The 
implications of the findings in the context of the Varieties of Capitalism theory are discussed.   
 
Introduction 
In this chapter we test how different institutional environments and associated collaborative 
types of labour management practices at firm level improve firm performance in European 
countries.   
The European ‘social model’ suggests that the existence of a collaborative approach 
to companies’ relations with employees has historic political origins (Martens, 1999).  In the 
German case, arguably at the centre of this model, a political consensus that aspects of 
‘liberalisation’ are required has long been developing (Lane, 2000; 2003).  Equally, at the 
European level, it has been argued that the European Employment Strategy, now in place for 
over ten years, threatens to crowd out the EU’s more traditional rights-based approach to 
employment regulation in the name of job creation (Fredman, 2006).  It is therefore important 
to evaluate the argument that the efficiency benefits of collaborative practices encouraged by 
rights-based approaches are inextricably linked to the benefits that employees derive from 
them (Akerlof, 1982).  In short, there is a need for an evaluation of the traditional emphasis 
on employment rights and related supportive institutional structures that constitute the 
European social model.   
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Many previous studies have attempted to establish a link between HRM strategies 
towards labour and profitability, but these have been criticised for omitting employee 
relations variables (Wright and Haggerty, 2005). We examine two specific types of 
managerial approaches to employer-employee relations as defined by Gooderham, Nordhaug 
and Ringdal (1999) to establish how effective each type is in enhancing organisational 
performance in different national contexts.  These two forms - ‘collaborative’ and 
‘calculative’ HRM - are essentially defined by the degree to which employee involvement 
and participation are emphasized.  The Gooderham et al. (1999) categories are essentially 
statistical constructs that may conflate or ignore important elements of HRM practice.  We 
therefore augment the analysis of collaborative practices as defined by Gooderham et al. with 
other indicators that explicitly consider the role of teams and employee consultative 
committees.   
We theoretically elaborate and empirically test the proposition that collaborative 
practices are more likely to enhance the labour extraction process and firm performance than 
calculative alternatives.  For the empirical analysis we use Cranet.  Our examination of 
European firms supports the proposition that in those countries where the institutional setting 
is most conducive, collaborative organisational level practices enhance the labour extraction 
process and lead to superior firm performance.  Calculative practices have a weaker impact 
on the labour extraction function and firm performance.   
The chapter is organised as follows.  In the following section, we review literature on 
the link between institutional settings and management strategies towards labour and develop 
a theoretical framework to analyse relationships in different national institutional 
environments. We also develop our hypotheses for evaluating relationships between such 
management practices and institutional settings.  We describe the data used and the scaling 
procedures employed in order to create our measures and we then test our propositions 
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empirically.  We show that resolving the inherent employer-employee conflict of interest by 
adopting optimal practices at organisational level corresponding to the national institutional 
setting is efficient and ultimately can be welfare improving and we discuss these results and 
draw conclusions in the final section of the chapter.  
 
Institutional setting, management strategies towards labour and firm performance 
Different national institutional frameworks support different managerial strategies.  As noted 
in Chapter X, the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature has variants, categorising countries 
and grouping them either by ‘Variety’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001) or ‘business system’ 
(Whitley, 1999).  The USA, Britain and Ireland are invariably put into one category (‘Liberal 
Market Economies’ [Hall and Soskice, 2001] or ‘compartmentalised’ [Whitley, 1999]) and 
those of Western Europe into another (‘Co-ordinated Market Economies’[Hall and Soskice, 
2001]; ‘collaborative’ [Whitley, 1999]).  The extent to which institutional complementarities 
within systems help develop high-trust relations at the organisational level is a defining 
characteristic of national systems (Amable, 2003; Goergen, Chahine, Brewster and Wood, 
forthcoming; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999).  Whitley (1999) places particular 
emphasis on the importance of co-operation between employers and employees, as 
demonstrated in the analytical significance of his ‘employer-employee interdependence’ 
concept, described as the degree to which both parties are willing to invest in each other.  The 
implication is that where interdependence is encouraged by the systemic institutional context 
and is relatively well-developed, this will in turn raise levels of mutual investment and 
efficiency, productivity and quality.  Systemic features in the economies categorised by 
Whitley (1999) as ‘co-operative’ serve to support the development of high-trust relations, and 
the converse is also true for his ‘compartmentalised’ (broadly equivalent to the ‘low trust’ or 
liberal market economies(LME)) category (Harcourt and Wood, 2007).   
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The formal institution of teamwork by management may both reflect and entail 
different degrees of delegation and therefore trust to the teams, but the very fact of their 
institution by management requires a certain minimum level of trust (Tzafrir, 2005).  
Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) and Tzafrir (2005) show that despite considerable variation, 
high-trust relations between management and employees are associated with team working 
and especially with its more autonomous forms.  Trust is likely to be further built by 
collective consultative mechanisms that, again allowing for degrees of variation between 
them, give employees an opportunity for ‘voice’ (see Chapter X).  These mechanisms afford 
a degree of protection to individuals exercising voice.  The collective provides support, 
encouragement and some protection to individual workers via its capacity to take sanctions 
against those threatening its members (Brewster et al., 2007).  Finally, group payment 
systems in general also tend to increase workers decision-making latitude and to reinforce 
employee collectives in relation to management and are therefore viewed negatively by 
‘calculative’ forms of management strategies which stress individual rewards for individual 
effort (Legge, 1995).    
Some forms of management strategies emphasise collaboration between employees 
and employers and others do not (Gooderham et al., 1999). Gooderham et al. (1999: 510) 
argue that human resource management entails an ‘inherent duality’ between ‘strong 
economic calculative considerations and ….. a more humanistic orientation’ and therefore 
distinguish two types of practice: ‘collaborative’ and ‘calculative’, structured by both agency 
and institutional settings in different countries.  The indicators of the two forms that they 
develop are shown in Table 1 below: 
- Table 1 about here - 
The calculative-collaborative distinction is useful, even if the elements in each 
category can be questioned. Thus, not only are the two scales not mirror images of each other, 
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but the calculative scale includes aspects that may equally be collaborative and the  
collaborative scale is basically a measure of communication within the organization. In order 
to capture high-trust relations in the collaborative form, we need to add to the Gooderham 
scales some assessment of how far work processes are delegated to employees, how far their 
views are sought through consultative mechanisms, and how worker collectives are 
reinforced by group payment systems.  We therefore incorporate three further indicators: one 
showing the extent of team-working, the second showing the extent of collective consultative 
practices and the third showing the extent of group payment systems.   
Levine and D’Andrea Tyson (1990), amongst others, report that substantial shop floor 
participation leads to some combination of an increase in satisfaction, commitment, quality, 
and productivity, and a reduction in labour turnover and absenteeism.  Therefore, we further 
extend our analysis of performance by relating labour extraction measures: absenteeism (abse) 
and turnover (turn) to various factors affecting the extraction function.  Low turnover has 
been shown to have a considerable affect on the effectiveness of HPWSs in generating 
improved results in the US context (Guthrie et al., 2004).   
In the spirit of Bowles (1985), Gordon (1994), and Osterman (1994) we view these 
human resource management strategies as instruments designed to enhance the ‘labour 
extraction function’.  Our first argument is that the labour extraction function should be 
viewed as endogenously determined by the interaction of the institutional environment and 
firm-specific practices (e.g., Bowles, 1985).  Our second argument, pursued in parallel with 
the first, is that collaborative forms of HRM are more likely to enhance the labour extraction 
process and bring improved performance than calculative alternatives (e.g., Levine and 
D’Andrea Tyson, 1990).  Third, we argue that the different forms of practices are likely to be 
differentially supported by different institutional frameworks (Gooderham et al., 1999). 
 5 
There have been many attempts, especially by American authors, to link human 
resource management policies and practices and firm performance; we make no attempt to 
review them here (for reviews, see Guest et al., 2003; Paauwe, 2009; Wright and Haggerty, 
2005).  Early studies tended to link a limited set of management practices to outcomes (see, 
for example, Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 1991).  Later studies, inspired by the ‘High Performance 
Work Systems’ (HPWS) paradigm, identified bundles of practices that were linked with 
superior organisational performance (Appelbaum et al, 2000; Becker and Gerhart, 1996; 
Huselid, 1995; Stavrou, Brewster and Charalambous, 2010).  However, there have also been 
empirical studies yielding negative results (Cappelli and Neumark, 2001) and the HPWS 
school of thought has been criticised for failing to recognise that conflicts in the employment 
relationship are likely to limit HRM effectiveness (Godard, 2004).  Godard’s (2004) criticism 
is consistent with that made of the HPWS literature by Wright and Haggerty (2005) who 
argue that there are missing variables in the discussion (those normally used are typically pay 
linked to productivity and promotion possibilities).  The missing variables are those linked 
both to employee relations broadly conceived and those relating to collaborative, trust-
building practices.  We therefore adopt a method that meets these criticisms by testing the 
links between two types of management practices encapsulating two different employee-
employer relations paradigms and firm performance.  These variables are particularly 
relevant in Europe, where employment relationships (even in the UK) are characterised by a 
relatively strong collective dimension in comparison to the USA (Hall and Gingerich, 2005). 
An alternative, less satisfactory framework for analysing the link between labour use 
and organisational performance is that of neoclassical efficiency-wage theory. The theory 
treats workers’ motivation as exogenous to the firm and the industrial relations system (note 
that employee motivation is assumed to depend solely on the real wage rate and intensity of 
monitoring).  Yet, from the lack of trade-off between wages and monitoring shown in studies 
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of ‘high and low trust’ national groupings, it follows that employees’ motivation must be 
treated as endogenous to the nature of labour–management relations (Gordon, 1994; 
Naastepad and Storm, 2006).   
There are other aspects of the labour extraction function (which may not be directly 
driven by management practices in relation to labour) that are, by and large, indicators of 
high-trust relations.  A minimum degree of co-operation is a necessary condition of 
production, but the level of co-operation may be raised if trust is at a high level (Akerlof, 
1982).  Trust, defined as the supposition by each side that the other will act benevolently, is 
more fragile and conditional on the perceived solidity of institutional guarantees (Creed and 
Miles, 1996; Goergen et al., forthcoming; Hoff, 2002).  Levels of trust may show some 
consistency across organisations, but are also likely to vary between different work and 
occupational groups, and employee strata; the difference between different employee strata is 
reflected in the Gooderham et al. (1999) indicators.   
As Buchele and Christiansen (1999, p. 91) argue, continuous improvements in 
productivity depend not on individual efforts, but on the effective interaction among workers 
(teamwork), among work groups or departments (coordination), and between management 
and workers (cooperation).  Baldamus (1961) argued that effort cannot be measured, and 
therefore management monitoring of employees had to be subordinated to motivational 
methods; the extent to which employees’ ideas of trust and teamwork were influenced by 
management become of vital importance to superior company performance.  Because no 
contract can be complete, a degree of control will always remain with employees, 
necessitating management efforts to build trust, reflected in efforts to influence employees’ 
underlying emotions (Baldamus, 1961, p.41).   
Akerlof (1982) similarly shows that individuals’ productive behaviour is determined 
by the social definition of the situation adopted by the relevant workers.  Akerlof (1982) 
 7 
focuses on the implicit gift-exchange nature of employment arrangements, where exchange is 
based on reciprocity and trust and relations are endogenously determined.
1
  Management has 
to make constant efforts to influence these relations (MacInnes et al., 1985).  Further, 
employees’ willingness to give up the protection offered by rigid work rules, disclose their 
proprietary (tacit) knowledge, and initiate changes in the production process that raise labour 
productivity and the firm’s capacity for innovation, depends, to a large extent, on 
management committing to ‘high-trust’ work practices (Buchele and Christiansen, 1999; 
Naastepad and Storm, 2006).  The (Taylorist) alternative is high levels of employee 
monitoring, which threaten to undermine trust.  The implication is that cooperative and 
group-based practices with strong implicit gift exchanges will tend to enhance firm 
performance.   
However, national systems do not determine managerial strategies.  At firm level, 
systemic options present managements, even in highly co-ordinated systems such as those in 
Germany, with considerable room for practices that differ from the clusters of ideal firm 
types specified by Whitley (Singe and Croucher, 2005).  ‘High-trust’ practices may also be 
attempted in low trust economies with varying degrees of success (Danford et al., 2005; 
Goergen et al., forthcoming), and may be more supported by legal and institutional 
arrangements in ‘low-trust’ economies than sometimes recognised, as UK case studies have 
indicated (Deakin et al. 2006).  On the other hand, perceived breaches of trust by 
managements in “high-trust” countries (for example, raising the intensity of monitoring or 
refusing real wage growth), may also occur.  In these countries, an increase in monitoring 
                                                 
1More specifically, Akerlof’s (1982) model posits that monitoring is performed by employee groups.  Excess 
remuneration to some members of the employee group and leniency of work rules constitute the major gifts by 
the employer to employees.  Employees’ gift to the employer - effort in excess of formal work standards - is 
linked to the employer’s gift to employees.  The key assumption in this mechanism is reciprocity as a major 
feature of gift exchange, as well as of market exchange.  In gift exchanges, however, effort norms are 
established according to the ‘fair day’s work’ concept rather than by market forces.  In return employees expect 
to be treated fairly by the employer.  The concept of fair treatment is not based on absolute standards but, rather, 
on comparisons of one’s own situation with that of other individuals.  Individuals use comparison with others as 
a guide to how they ought to behave or how they ought to be treated. 
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intensity, ceteris paribus, may cause reduced employees’ effort and productivity even more 
drastically (Drago and Perlman, 1989; Goergen et al., forthcoming; Naastepad and Storm, 
2006).   
In summary, our hypotheses on the optimality of HRM practices and their synergies 
within various institutional settings are as follows:  
H1: Collaborative forms of HRM practice are more strongly associated with superior 
firm performance than calculative forms 
H2: These associations are strongest where national institutional and normative 
settings support them 
H3: Employer-employee consultative committees and collective payment methods are 
associated with superior firm performance.  
 
Data and variables 
We econometrically test the hypotheses derived from our theoretical analysis using data 
extracted from Cranet.  We use data from the 1999/2000 round of surveys, while the study by 
Gooderham et al. (1999), which we extend, uses the previous round of surveys in 1995/1996.   
Since a central issue in our analysis is the importance of institutional factors and 
organisational practices for the labour extraction function, and thus for firm performance, we 
use data from several countries exhibiting diverse institutional settings and diverse labour 
management practices.  Following this line of reasoning we also control for and compare 
results from samples with and without firms that are foreign subsidiaries.
2
  The rationale is 
that although such firms’ practices may generally be not that much different from those of the 
indigenous companies (Brewster, Wood and Brookes, 2008; Farndale, Brewster and Poutsma, 2008) 
                                                 
2
We report here results for samples where we do not exclude but control for the status of a firm being a foreign 
subsidiary.  Using Wald tests of differences between coefficients estimated from the full and the restricted 
sample shows that the coefficients do not significantly differ.  We report here results from the full sample with a 
control for foreign subsidiary status which does not appears to be statistically significant in any specification.   
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this is a complex relationship (ibid.) and may have been at least influenced by different 
country-of–origin institutional environments, albeit in a complex way as argued by 
Gooderham et al. (1998).   
The main dependent variable in our analysis is firm performance (perf) measured as a 
composite index comprised of five partial measures: service quality, level of productivity, 
profitability, product to market time, and rate of innovation.  Each partial measure is an 
ordinal categorical variable.
3
  We apply Mokken’s nonparametric scaling approach to 
produce our synthetic performance measure (Mokken and Lewis, 1982). The unweighted sum 
of item scores has to be monotonously related to the latent true scores as demonstrated by 
Sjitsma et al.(1990).  This implies that Mokken’s model provides estimates of the scale scores 
only at ordinal level.  As in other studies, the primary scaling criterion is Loevinger’s H-
coefficient of homogeneity.  A set of items constitute a scale if the total scale has a H-value 
exceeding 0.30; values above 0.50 indicate strong scales.  The details of the items included in 
the performance scale, results of the scaling procedure, and reliability analysis are reported in 
Table 2.   
- Table 2 about here - 
As noted above we believe absenteeism (abse) and turnover (turn) to be factors 
affecting the labour extraction function and we therefore add them to our analysis.  
Absenteeism is measured as average days per employee per year.  Turnover is the annual 
staff turnover in percent.  Both measures of labour extraction are approximate and are 
                                                 
3
We recognise a potential bias in the construction of the dependent variable.  The dependent variable is a 
composite index of five measures, including service quality and innovation.  Arguably, it might favour a 
collaborative view, since service quality and innovation are, theoretically, both, when effective, dependent more 
strongly upon collaborative processes.  However, it has also been argued that innovation for example is more 
likely to be found in calculative settings such as the liberal market economies (Bartelsman and Hinloopen, 2005; 
Deelen et al., 2006).  In order to investigate the issue empirically, we run regressions with only narrowly defined, 
and neutral to HRM, measures of performance, specifically, level of productivity and profitability.  The results 
of these regressions are qualitatively very similar to the results reported in the paper suggesting that the 
formulation of the dependent variable as a composite index does not bias our main findings.  The auxiliary 
regression results are available from the authors upon request. 
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affected by various economic and institutional country-specific factors in addition to the main 
determinants of the labour extraction function.  With this caveat, linking absenteeism and 
turnover to human resource management practices in regressions where we have controlled 
for major economic and institutional factors for represents a useful empirical representation 
of our theoretical framework. 
To formulate measures of the human resource management strategies within firms 
that approximate aspects of institutional environment at firm level as well we refer to the 
strategic HRM model of calculative or collaborative practices following Gooderham et al. 
(1999).   
Next, we extend the Gooderham et al. (1999) typology with a third measure explicitly 
reflecting the existence of joint consultative committees and group payment systems, which 
we designate group-based practices (grpr).  In this index we include features at firm level 
reflecting the existence of joint employee consultative committees and profit-sharing schemes 
applied to different segments of the labour force.  We expect that the index will capture some 
aspects of the impact of Akerlof’s (1982) implicit gift exchange mechanism on labour 
extraction and ultimately on firm performance. 
To develop measures for calculative and collaborative practices, we use Mokken’s 
nonparametric latent trial model for unidimensional scaling (Mokken and Lewis, 1982).  
Thus, we follow the methodology used by Gooderham et al. (1999) which allows us to 
compare the measures of interest estimated with data from two consecutive rounds of surveys.  
Mokken’s approach does not make overly restrictive assumptions and provides an internal 
scaling criterion that ensures a unidimensional scale.  This is an important advantage in this 
case where dichotomous items are used and do not satisfy the assumption of interval scale 
items.  Details of the items included in the scales, results of the scaling procedure, and 
reliability analysis are reported in Table 1.   
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Besides variables of interest related to these alternative management practices, the 
determinants of the labour extraction function - cost of job loss at firm level (w
d
) and 
intensity of monitoring (s) – are the main variables in our performance regression 
specifications.  The w
d
 variable is measured as the percentage of labour cost in the operating 
costs which when controlled for firm size and external market conditions (see below) would 
approximate to the potential cost of job loss at firm level.  The s variable is measured by the 
proportion of the firm’s employees that are managers.  In the Cranet dataset there are three 
other categories of employees reported: manual, clerical and professional (technical) 
employees.  As Gordon (1994) argues, the proportion of managers in the firm’s employment 
approximates to the intensity of monitoring.   
Finally, we control for several other firm characteristics affecting performance.  These 
are log of firm size (lfsize) and log of firm age (lfage), qualitative characteristics of the labour 
force such as dummy variable indicating employees 45 years of age or older (eage45) and 
dummy variable indicating employees with at least higher education (eedugr).  Market 
conditions are controlled for by a three-step ordinal scale (market) indicating whether the 
firm’s market is booming, steady or stagnating. Industrial sector information – a set of 
industry dummy variables - is included in all regression specifications (except the base one).  
In all regressions a control dummy variable for foreign-subsidiary status of firms is also 
included.  Country dummy variables are used in all extended regression specifications to 
control for important variations in institutional settings.  In selected specifications also cross-
effects of the country dummies and HRM variables of interest are included in addition.  
Summary statistics and short definitions of all regression variables are reported in Table 3.
4
 
- Table 3 about here - 
                                                 
4
In all regressions we have included as controls for measurement error, due to self-reporting, variables 
describing important characteristics of individuals that filled out the questionnaires.  These individual-level 
control variables are gender, education, years of service in the organization and we assume that they are not 




We estimate three sets of OLS regressions.  First, we estimate a set of equations where firm 
performance is directly linked to the HRM variables of interest while controlling for 
institutional context and several other important determinants of performance such as firm 
size and age, qualitative characteristics of the labour force, market conditions, and industry 
specificity.  The results of this analysis are reported in Tables 4a and 4b.  We start with a base 
specification where only variables corresponding to the neoclassical efficiency-wage model 
are included.  Then we extend the specification by introducing a richer set of controls and 
HRM practice variables.  Second, we consider a direct empirical approximation of the labour 
extraction function, using two dependent variables, labour force turnover and absenteeism.  
We extend the specifications in a manner similar to the performance regressions.  The results 
are reported in Table 5a and Table 5b, respectively.
5
 
- Table 4a about here - 
Tables 4a and 4b contain several general findings of interest.  The management 
practice variables have positive and, in general, statistically significant impacts on firm 
performance.  When the variables are interacted with country dummies (Table 4b), thus 
controlling for the specific link between HRM practices and institutional settings, we find 
differential effects of the variables of interest on firm performance.  Overall, the effect of 
collaborative practices is positive and significant in countries variously categorised in VoC 
literature as ‘co-operative’, ‘co-ordinated’ and so on (e.g., Scandinavia, Germany, France).  
The group-based-practices variable significantly impacts performance of firms in the ‘co-
ordinated’ category of country such as France.  In most countries it seems that both types of 
                                                 
5
All regressions contain a dummy variable controlling for the foreign-subsidiary status of firms, and individual-
reporter controls which were all found not to be statistically significant in any regression and therefore their 
coefficients were not reported.  Furthermore, the stepwise introduction of explanatory variables and the stability 
of coefficients in all regressions suggest minimal problems with endogeneity.   
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HRM approach coexist; however, there usually is one dominant (or more important) type of 
practice affecting firm performance.   
- Table 4b about here - 
Thus, the results related to the interaction between HRM practices and country-
specific (institutional) conditions are of particular interest. Specifically, Table 4b shows that 
calculative practices affect performance positively (but not statistically significantly) in most 
countries analysed, compared to the reference country (the UK).  The only country where 
calculative practices have a negative and statistically significant impact on performance is 
Denmark.  This may be related to the very specific evolution of Danish industrial relations 
(Due et al., 1994).  Collaborative practices seem to have stronger economic and statistically 
significant positive impacts on performance in several ‘co-operative’ or ‘co-ordinated’ 
countries variously such as France, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and Spain.  With 
respect to group-based practices, UK firms appear to perform similar to firms in other 
countries as only firms in France outperform British firms.  Group-based practices also have 
a positive but not statistically significant impact on performance in several other ‘co-
operative’ or ‘co-ordinated’ countries.   
The results in Table 5a and Table 5b confirm our main findings as the largest impact 
derives from collaborative and group-based practices.  Absenteeism (Table 5a) is lower in 
firms that employ any of the three types of practices, controlling for industry and country 
effects.  Turnover (Table 5b) is also minimised by applying HRM practices.  These results 
suggest that the labour extraction function is improved by systematic application of the 
practices at firm level.  It is evident that collaborative and group-based practices have a 
stronger impact in both sets of regressions.  When the link between HRM and country-
specific institutions is explored, we again find differential effects across countries and types 
of practice, in line with the different institutional contexts.  These findings confirm our 
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proposition that the labour extraction function should be viewed as endogenously determined 
by the interaction of the institutional environment and firm-specific HRM rather than as 
simply an exogenous trade-off between wages and monitoring as neoclassical efficiency-
wage theory asserts.   
- Table 5a about here - 
Specifically, in Table 5a, column (4), the interaction terms of collaborative practices 
measure are negative for all countries and are statistically significant for Germany, Sweden, 
Denmark, and Austria.  This suggests that collaborative practices improve labour extraction 
in every country.  However, the impact is strongest in the four countries mentioned.  The 
relationships depicted by the interaction terms of group-based practices measure are also 
negative everywhere, implying less absenteeism, except in Spain where the coefficient is 
positive but statistically insignificant.  Interestingly, the impact of group-based practices on 
absenteeism is most statistically significant in the Scandinavian countries.   
- Table 5b about here - 
The results in Table 5b, column (4) where the dependent variable is employee 
turnover also support the general proposition that both collaborative and group-based HRM 
practices positively impact the labour extraction process.  It is important to note, however, 
that when the cross effects of calculative practices measure are considered, for several 
countries (Denmark, Finland, Austria and Belgium) the effects are positive, suggesting that 
there is more employee turnover in firms that use calculative practices.  The results for the 
cross effects of collaborative practices measure are the opposite and show that the impact on 
labour extraction is positive (as demonstrated by low turnover) in all countries as the effect is 
statistically significant in France, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland.  The results for 
cross effects of group-based practices measure are mixed as the labour extraction function 
appears to be adversely (reflected in high turnover) and statistically significantly affected in 
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Spain and Ireland two countries with different institutions and level of co-ordination of the 
economy.   
 
5 Conclusion and discussion 
The chapter has tested the theoretically derived hypothesis (H1) that collaborative forms of 
HRM are more likely to enhance the labour extraction process and firm performance than 
calculative alternatives.  The proposition was supported in those countries where the 
institutional setting was most conducive to these organisational level practices (H2), which 
are essentially related to strong communication with employees.  The countries concerned are 
the strongest versions of the ‘Co-ordinated Market Economies’ of Western Europe (Hall and 
Ginerich, 2005).  This supplements and is consistent with other studies’ findings (Brewster et 
al., 2007a, b) in relation to forms of employee voice.  Within these national contexts, 
different forms of voice are encouraged by the institutional framework and therefore coexist, 
mutually reinforcing each other, optimizing employee wages and working conditions, 
productivity and organizational performance (Hubler and Jirjahn, 2003).  In the UK context, 
inherent tensions between different forms of practice exist, with particularly strong pressures 
towards individualization and direct forms of expression (Bryson, 2004).  
Calculative practices had a weaker impact on the labour extraction function and firm 
performance.  In the case of Denmark, these were negatively associated with performance 
and negatively associated with absenteeism and turnover.  Denmark has an institutional 
framework providing especially strong support for collaborative practices, and has been 
categorised as an unambiguously ‘Co-ordinated Market Economy’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Hall and Gingerich, 2005).  Others, however, have categorized Denmark, along with the 
Netherlands, as flexicurity countries (Bekker, 2011; Madsen, 2004; Méda, 2011; Viebrock 
and Clasen, 2009), a separate form of market economy.  It is distinctive within the CME 
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category for its high degree of employer-union consensual decision taking, requiring 
relatively little state intervention for its maintenance (Due et al., 1994, 2000). This suggests 
that in a country with an especially strong institutional and normative disposition towards 
collaborative practices, the contrast between calculative practices and these contextual factors 
is so acute as to generate a counterproductive employee reaction and weaker firm 
performance.   
We also tested the hypothesis (H3) that group-based practices might also generate 
improved employee-employer relationships and performance.  The findings here are more 
mixed, but confirm and extend to other countries analyses, specifically to the German case 
(Addison et al., 2004; Singe and Croucher, 2005).  Other strongly collaborative national 
contexts gave similar results.  The mixed nature of the findings concerning group-based 
practices is to be expected given the wide range of contents subsumed under this heading.  
They also interact with other arrangements; their effectiveness is conditional on a wide range 
of factors, including how they are combined with other complementary approaches such as 
quality circles (Becker and Gerhart, 1996).  Group-based practices were expected to give 
positive results in countries where they were strongly supported by the context and again, this 
was the case.  In Sweden, such practices had a strong effect on absenteeism in relation to the 
UK reference group, possibly because of their content but equally possibly because of the 
way that they act in line with the particularly strong collaborative institutional framework 
(Whitley, 1999).    
The limitations of this study are firstly that employee attitudes have not been directly 
tested and secondly that self-reported (subjective) measures of all the indicators are used.  In 
the latter case, for reasons of confidentiality, the performance data cannot be matched with 
accounting data.  However there is evidence of a strong correlation between managerial 
reports of firm performance and external, independent measures (Dess and Robinson, 1984; 
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Geringer and Herbert, 1991; Powell, 1992).  Provided respondents are at a senior enough 
level (which is the case for the Cranet respondents), subjective and objective measures of 
performance converge and their relationships with independent variables are equivalent (Wall 
Mitchie, Patterson, Wood, Sheenhan, Clegg and West, 2004; c.f. Delaney and Huselid, 1996). 
Nonetheless, it would have been ideal to combine these with more objective measures as 
recommended by Wall et al. (2004).  Future research could usefully address both of these 
limitations.  In the first case, that of employee attitudes, there is a particular need not only to 
approach the issue by survey data but also to combine survey data with other data (which 
might helpfully be observationally-derived) that could demonstrate the mechanisms at work 
at organisational level.   
Nevertheless, our findings have significant implications for political economy.  First, 
they provide underpinning for the utility of the ‘CME’ concept itself, which has been 
criticised for a lack of differentiation (Allen, 2004; Amable, 2003), but which in respect of 
the employment practice-performance link appears to have some justification.  On the other 
hand, the finding has a second consequence for the significance of the Varieties of Capitalism 
conceptualisation.  Central to the Varieties of Capitalism formulation in its original form is 
the argument that particular national institutional configurations cannot be considered 
‘superior’ to others.  Rather, it is a question of the ‘fit’ between labour market practices, the 
mode of production (‘Fordist’ or ‘flexible specialisation’) at organisational level and the 
requirements of the markets being sold into that determine success in specific markets (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001).  Becker (2007) has criticised the theory, suggesting that practices may be 
quite different from those envisaged by Hall and Soskice, but may nevertheless be ‘equi-
functional’.  In this view, LMEs can perform as well as CMEs even in ‘flexible specialisation’ 
types of production if companies adopt ‘equi-functional’ practices.  In short, companies 
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operating in LMEs can succeed even in markets demanding high quality where they 
compensate for a lack of contextual support.   
Our findings demonstrate that the CME model is superior in supporting productive 
efficiency at the organisational level.  This is consistent with Panic (2007), who demonstrates 
that there are no macro-economic performance grounds for ‘liberalising’ European 
economies since the Scandinavian economies have performed comparatively well, especially 
in relation to LMEs.  Our evidence supplements his by showing that the ways that CMEs 
encourage company level communications appear central to raising efficiency.  All of this 
supports the EU policy of attempting to extend industrial communications policies across the 
EU, including to the LMEs (Britain and Ireland) and the new entrant countries via such 
measures as the Information and Consultation Directive.  It also tends to support an argument 
that the weak transposition of the Directive into English law is inadequate and unlikely to 
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Table1Calculative and Collaborative LMPs 
Calculative:  
Individual and formal 
Collaborative: 
Mission, briefings, communication 
Individual performance appraisals for 
managers 
Written mission statement 
Individual performance appraisals for 
professional/technical staff 
Formal briefings about company strategy for 
managers  
Individual performance appraisals for clerical 
staff 
Formal briefings about company strategy for 
professional/technical staff 
Individual performance appraisals for manual 
staff 
Formal briefings about company strategy for 
clerical staff 
Individual reward systems (merit pay and 
performance related pay) for managers 
Formal briefings about company strategy for 
manual staff 
Individual reward systems (merit pay and 
performance related pay) for 
professional/technical staff 
Written communicationpolicy with employees 
Individual reward systems (merit pay and 
performance related pay) for clerical staff 
 
Individual reward systems (merit pay and 
performance related pay) for manual staff 
 
Formal evaluation of personnel training 
immediately after training 
 





Table 2 Performance and LMPs scales 
Scale/Variable MSP Alpha  
 Mean H   
Performance scale (perf) - 0.45 0.76  
Profitability between 3 and 1 (high-low) 2.13 0.43 0.71  
Productivity between 3 and 1 (high-low) 2.21 0.49 0.69  
Service quality between 3 and 1 (high-low) 2.45 0.44 0.74  
Product to market between 3 and 1 (high-low) 2.06 0.50 0.68  
Innovation between 3 and 1 (high-low) 2.10 0.40 0.73  
Calculative scale (calc) - 0.64 0.71  
Individual rewards: manual 0.15 0.84 0.69  
Individual rewards: clerical 0.28 0.87 0.68  
Individual rewards: professionals 0.41 0.87 0.69  
Individual rewards: managers 0.66 0.82 0.71  
Performance appraisal: manual 0.47 0.46 0.68  
Performance appraisal: clerical 0.60 0.62 0.65  
Performance appraisal: professionals 0.65 0.66 0.65  
Performance appraisal: managers 0.67 0.56 0.67  
Formal evaluation: immediate 0.52 0.36 0.70  
Formal evaluation: later 0.32 0.43 0.71  
Collaborative scale (coll) - 0.63 0.70  
Strategy briefings: manual 0.36 0.88 0.57  
Strategy briefings: clerical 0.47 0.84 0.54  
Strategy briefings: professionals 0.62 0.76 0.59  
Strategy briefings: managers 0.96 0.67 0.71  
Written mission statement 0.80 0.36 0.71  
Communication policy 0.77 0.30 0.73  
Group-practices scale (grpr) - 0.57 0.71  
Joint consultative committee 0.56 0.30 0.75  
Employee share options: manual 0.15 0.56 0.68  
Employee share options: clerical 0.16 0.53 0.68  
Employee share options: professionals 0.19 0.49 0.68  
Profit sharing: manual 0.20 0.58 0.66  
Profit sharing: clerical 0.24 0.63 0.66  
Profit sharing: professionals 0.29 0.65 0.66  
Group bonus: manual 0.21 0.61 0.70  
Group bonus: clerical 0.20 0.66 0.69  
Group bonus: professionals 0.21 0.68 0.69  
Notes: MSP denotes Mokken Scaling Program.  H is Loevinger’s coefficient of homogeneity 
(weighted); all H-coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 0.001 level.  Alpha is 
Cronbach’s alpha measure of reliability.   
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Table 3 Summary statistics of regression variables 
Variable Description Mean S.d. 
perf Performance composite index ranging between 5 
and 15 (low-high) 
10.97 2.30 
absc Average number of days of absence per 
employee per year 
7.95 6.52 





 Percentage of labour cost in total operating cost 38.98 21.36 
s Ratio of managers to employees in percent 9.10 9.20 
lfsize Log of firm size (total labour force) 6.05 1.20 
lfage Log of firm age (years) 3.66 0.91 
eage45 Percentage of labour force 45 years of age or 
older 
32.87 18.76 
eedugr Percentage of labour force with graduate or post-
graduate education 
23.11 16.77 
market Index of market conditions and business cycle 
development ranging between 1 and 3 
(recession-expansion) 
1.61 0.70 
calc Calculative LMPs composite index ranging 
between 0 and 10 
4.65 2.23 
coll Collaborative LMPs composite index ranging 
between 0 and 6 
3.97 1.62 
grpr Group-based LMPs composite index ranging 
between 0 and 10 
4.24 2.05 
Manufacturing Manufacturing industries dummy variable 0.50 0.79 
Construction Construction industries dummy variable 0.04 0.20 
Transportation Transportation industries dummy variable 0.06 0.24 
Bank and finance Banking and finance services industries dummy 
variable 
0.09 0.29 
Personal services Personal services industries dummy variable 0.01 0.11 
Other industries Other industries dummy variable 0.30 0.46 
Foreign subsidiary Dummy variable which is 1 if the firm is a 
foreign subsidiary and 0 otherwise 
0.30 0.46 
UK UK dummy variable 0.14 0.34 
France France dummy variable 0.08 0.26 
Germany Germany dummy variable 0.15 0.35 
Sweden Sweden dummy variable 0.04 0.21 
Spain Spain dummy variable 0.06 0.23 
Denmark Denmark dummy variable 0.08 0.27 
Norway Norway dummy variable 0.13 0.34 
Ireland Ireland dummy variable 0.11 0.31 
Finland Finland dummy variable 0.11 0.31 
Austria Austria dummy variable 0.05 0.23 
Belgium Belgium dummy variable 0.05 0.22 
Note: Number of observations used in calculating summery statistics is 1045 except for absc and turn 
where number of observations is 779 and 965, respectively.  
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Table 4a Regression analysis of firm performance 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
w
d
 -0.019 (0.003) -0.018 (0.004) -0.017 (0.004) -0.015 (0.004) 
s 0.006 (0.008) 0.006 (0.009) 0.006 (0.009) 0.007 (0.009) 
lfsize 0.025 (0.059) 0.077 (0.064) 0.0049 (0.064) 0.016 (0.065) 
lfage -0.204 (0.082) -0.167 (0.084) -0.153 (0.084) -0.155 (0.084) 
eage45 -0.004 (0.004) -0.003 (0.004) -0.003 (0.004) -0.003 (0.004) 
eedugr 0.004 (0.003) 0.006 (0.003) 0.005 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) 
market 0.182 (0.102) 0.206 (0.103) 0.202 (0.103)  0.194 (0.102) 
calc - - 0.063 (0.032) 0.056 (0.032) 
coll - - 0.075 (0.045) 0.066 (0.047) 
grpr - - - 0.102 (0.039) 
Construction - 0.329 (0.361) 0.402 (0.361) 0.445 (0.360) 
Transportation - -0.187 (0.309) -0.129 (0.361) -0.080 (0.308) 
Bank and finance - -0.229 (0.274) -0.261 (0.273) -0.249 (0.272) 
Personal services - 0.455 (0.632) 0.427 (0.631) 0.436 (0.629) 
Other industries - -0.300 (0.182) -0.278 (0.182) -0.202 (0.184) 
France - -0.709 (0.360) -0.635 (0.328) -0.727 (0.338) 
Germany - 0.297 (0.272) 0.145 (0.277) 0.077 (0.277) 
Sweden - -0.500 (0.380) -0.581 (0.380) -0.526 (0.379) 
Spain - -0.260 (0.353) -0.158 (0.355) -0.188 (0.357) 
Denmark - 0.014 (0.322) 0.075 (0.324) 0.167 (0.325) 
Norway - -0.134 (0.279) -0.020 (0.285) -0.041 (0.285) 
Ireland - 0.023 (0.302) 0.087 (0.302) 0.158 (0.302) 
Finland - -0.001 (0.289) 0.036 (0.302) 0.063 (0.302) 
Austria - 0.802 (0.355) 0.885 (0.356) 0.943 (0.355) 
Belgium - 0.315 (0.364) 0.281 (0.363) 0.355 (0.364) 
Control for subsidiary Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for reporter Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2R  0.24 0.28 0.32 0.35 
Number observations 1045 1045 1045 1045 
Note: In the table each column shows coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis.  Coefficients in 
bold denote significance at 10% level or better.  Reference country is the UK and reference industry is 
manufacturing.  
 27 
Table 4b Regression analysis of firm performance: cross effects 
Variable (5) (6) 
w
d
 -0.017 (0.004) -0.015 (0.004) 
s 0.005 (0.009) 0.004 (0.009) 
lfsize 0.057 (0.065) 0.047 (0.066) 
lfage -0.172 (0.085) -0.168 (0.085) 
eage45 -0.003 (0.004) -0.002 (0.004) 
eedugr 0.005 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) 
market 0.198 (0.104) 0.199 (0.104) 
calc 0.032 (0.084) 0.032 (0.084) 
coll 0.030 (0.118) 0.040 (0.118) 
grpr - 0.111 (0.059) 
France -1.540 (1.036) -1.415 (1.127) 
Germany 0.981 (0.781) 1.063 (0.824) 
Sweden -0.968 (0.631) -1.046 (0.853) 
Spain -1.280 (1.080) -1.841 (1.117) 
Denmark -0.969 (0.992) -0.711 (0.914) 
Norway -0.796 (0.844) -0.773 (0.862) 
Ireland 0.576 (0.926) 0.796 (0.940) 
Finland 0.199 (0.994) 0.183 (0.901) 
Austria 0.610 (0.892) 0.482 (0.588) 
Belgium -0.693 (0.452) -0.572 (0.413) 
France*calc 0.031 (0.134) 0.036 (0.138) 
Germany*calc 0.166 (0.122) 0.163 (0.122) 
Sweden*calc 0.190 (0.189) 0.200 (0.188) 
Spain*calc 0.133 (0.176) 0.167 (0.178) 
Denmark*calc -0.410 (0.137) -0.314 (0.143) 
Norway*calc -0.046 (0.117) -0.052 (0.119) 
Ireland*calc -0.093 (0.129) -0.099 (0.130) 
Finland*calc 0.018 (0.126) 0.010 (0.126) 
Austria*calc 0.062 (0.156) 0.074 (0.155) 
Belgium*calc 0.096 (0.162) 0.064 (0.170) 
France*coll 0.291 (0.129) 0.322 (0.159) 
Germany*coll 0.201 (0.133) 0.203 (0.132) 
Sweden*coll 0.146 (0.083) 0.130 (0.083) 
Spain*coll 0.380 (0.224) 0.373 (0.223) 
Denmark*coll 0.272 (0.155) 0.269 (0.154) 
Norway*coll 0.172 (0.174) 0.154 (0.175) 
Ireland*coll -0.027 (0.180) -0.034 (0.184) 
Finland*coll -0.051 (0.193) -0.072 (0.194) 
Austria*coll 0.042 (0.158) -0.037 (0.157) 
Belgium*coll 0.334 (0.201) 0.328 (0.206) 
France*grpr - 0.226 (0.135) 
Germany*grpr - 0.081 (0.136) 
Sweden*grpr - -0.012 (0.165) 
Spain*grpr - 0.289 (0.225) 
Denmark*grpr - -0.196 (0.219) 
Norway*grpr - -0.126 (0.129) 
Ireland*grpr - -0.035 (0.131) 
Finland*grpr - 0.061 (0.126) 
Austria*grpr - 0.133 (0.148) 
Belgium*grpr - 0.088 (0.132) 
Control for subsidiary Yes Yes 
Controls for reporter Yes Yes 
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2R  0.39 0.43 
Number observations 1045 1045 
Note: In the table each column shows coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis.  Coefficients in 
bold denote significance at 10% level or better.  Industry dummies are included in all regressions but 
results are not reported.  Reference country is the UK and reference industry is manufacturing.  
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Table 5a Analysis of labour extraction function: absenteeism 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
w
d
 0.009 (0.012) 0.008 (0.012) 0.006 (0.012) 0.007 (0.013) 
s -0.035 (0.027) -0.056 (0.029) -0.054 (0.029) -0.058 (0.030) 
lfsize 0.423 (0.194) 0.370 (0.204) 0.458 (0.211) 0.402 (0.214) 
lfage -0.029 (0.265) -0.218 (0.268) -0.195 (0.269) -0.123 (0.274) 
eage45 0.039 (0.012) 0.039 (0.012) 0.040 (0.013) 0.036 (0.013) 
eedugr -0.030 (0.009) -0.025 (0.009) -0.024 (0.009) -0.023 (0.009) 
market -0.234 (0.340) -0.133 (0.336) -0.094 (0.337) -0.111 (0.342) 
calc - - -0.042 (0.104) -0.027 (0.253) 
coll - - -0.172 (0.103) -0.114 (0.360) 
grpr - - -0.200 (0.108) -0.068 (0.242) 
France - 3.159 (1.048) 3.354 (1.100) 4.583 (2.801) 
Germany - 2.262 (0.821) 2.022 (0.842) 3.341 (2.569) 
Sweden - 6.043 (1.354) 6.037 (1.358) 6.308 (4.023) 
Spain - 2.374 (1.098) 1.983 (1.120) 3.820 (2.507) 
Denmark - -1.842 (1.074) -1.914 (1.093) -1.835 (1.330) 
Norway - 3.046 (0.846) 3.028 (0.877) 2.377 (2.669) 
Ireland - 0.251 (0.969) 0.116 (0.981) 0.695 (1.118) 
Finland - -1.335 (0.928) -1.186 (0.950) -2.396 (2.339) 
Austria - 2.683 (1.114) 2.502 (1.118) 4.926 (2.181) 
Belgium - 0.060 (0.203) -0.020 (0.205) 1.440 (2.064) 
France*calc - - - -0.478 (0.430) 
Germany*calc - - - -0.030 (0.077) 
Sweden*calc - - - 1.111 (0.780) 
Spain*calc - - - -0.695 (0.562) 
Denmark*calc - - - 0.224 (0.477) 
Norway*calc - - - 0.191 (0.358) 
Ireland*calc - - - 0.095 (0.212) 
Finland*calc - - - 0.523 (0.407) 
Austria*calc - - - -0.206 (0.511) 
Belgium*calc - - - -0.080 (0.525) 
France*coll - - - -0.014 (0.087) 
Germany*coll - - - -0.397 (0.218) 
Sweden*coll - - - -1.153 (0.703) 
Spain*coll - - - 0.092 (0.590) 
Denmark*coll - - - -0.270 (0.137) 
Norway*coll - - - -0.739 (0.532) 
Ireland*coll - - - -0.260 (0.412) 
Finland*coll - - - -0.326 (0.324) 
Austria*coll - - - -1.326 (0.705) 
Belgium*coll - - - -0.253 (0.347) 
France*grpr - - - -0.116 (0.099) 
Germany*grpr - - - -0.056 (0.117) 
Sweden*grpr - - - -2.146 (0.572) 
Spain*grpr - - - 0.351 (0.837) 
Denmark*grpr - - - -0.141 (0.076) 
Norway*grpr - - - -0.372 (0.210) 
Ireland*grpr - - - -0.002 (0.159) 
Finland*grpr - - - -0.585 (0.349) 
Austria*grpr - - - -0.174 (0.186) 
Belgium*grpr - - - -0.034 (0.074) 
Control for subsidiary Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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2R  0.23 0.30 0.34 0.41 
Number observations 779 779 779 779 
Note: In the table each column shows coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis.  Coefficients in bold 
denote significance at 10% level or better.  Industry dummies are included in all regressions but results are not 
reported.  Reference country is the UK and reference industry is manufacturing.  
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Table 5b Analysis of labour extraction function: turnover 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
w
d
 0.032 (0.016) 0.016 (0.017) 0.016 (0.017) 0.016 (0.017) 
s 0.095 (0.040) 0.045 (0.044) 0.036 (0.044) 0.050 (0.045) 
lfsize 0.432 (0.255) 0.264 (0.290) 0.295 (0.300) 0.296 (0.302) 
lfage -1.505 (0.378) -1.098 (0.379) -0.996 (0.380) -0.919 (0.385) 
eage45 -0.075 (0.018) -0.080 (0.018) -0.076 (0.018) -0.082 (0.018) 
eedugr -0.019 (0.012) -0.027 (0.012) -0.027 (0.013) -0.028 (0.013) 
market 0.766 (0.482) 0.698 (0.472) 0.718 (0.473) 0.651 (0.479) 
calc - - -0.128 (0.094) -0.138 (0.386) 
coll - - -0.394 (0.151) -0.658 (0.536) 
grpr - - -0.315 (0.183) -0.622 (0.364) 
France - -7.178 (1.484) -6.780 (1.542) -2.209 (3.394) 
Germany - -8.239 (1.227) -8.133 (1.252) -9.006 (3.808) 
Sweden - -8.064 (1.700) -8.342 (1.703) -8.996 (7.491) 
Spain - -5.269 (1.672) -5.639 (1.697) -2.591 (3.609) 
Denmark - -3.951 (1.495) -3.656 (1.518) -6.549 (3.952) 
Norway - -6.720 (1.244) -6.139 (1.278) -8.298 (3.927) 
Ireland - -5.879 (1.380) -5.785 (1.390) -8.737 (4.318) 
Finland - -7.712 (1.358) -7.323 (1.377) -6.735 (4.719) 
Austria - -7.847 (1.628) -7.393 (1.634) -9.596 (5.145) 
Belgium - -7.558 (1.629) -7.899 (1.630) -9.689 (5.131) 
France*calc - - - -0.570 (0.640) 
Germany*calc - - - 0.7757 (0.560) 
Sweden*calc - - - 0.537 (0.836) 
Spain*calc - - - -0.839 (0.885) 
Denmark*calc - - - 1.182 (0.661) 
Norway*calc - - - 0.248 (0.539) 
Ireland*calc - - - 0.862 (0.604) 
Finland*calc - - - 1.488 (0.590) 
Austria*calc - - - 0.813 (0.424) 
Belgium*calc - - - 0.773 (0.355) 
France*coll - - - -1.790 (0.938) 
Germany*coll - - - -0.824 (0.497) 
Sweden*coll - - - -0.732 (0.442) 
Spain*coll - - - -1.921 (1.233) 
Denmark*coll - - - -1.277 (0.729) 
Norway*coll - - - -0.157 (0.591) 
Ireland*coll - - - -0.999 (0.855) 
Finland*coll - - - -1.618 (0.904) 
Austria*coll - - - -0.638 (1.205) 
Belgium*coll - - - -0.351 (0.974) 
France*grpr - - - -0.280 (0.733) 
Germany*grpr - - - -0.041 (0.420) 
Sweden*grpr - - - 0.258 (0.745) 
Spain*grpr - - - 1.712 (1.008) 
Denmark*grpr - - - -1.429 (1.090) 
Norway*grpr - - - -0.215 (0.664) 
Ireland*grpr - - - 1.234 (0.622) 
Finland*grpr - - - -0.138 (0.595) 
Austria*grpr - - - 0.366 (0.858) 
Belgium*grpr - - - -0.250 (1.013) 
Control for subsidiary Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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2R  0.25 0.32 0.36 0.42 
Number observations 965 965 965 965 
Note: In the table each column shows coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis.  Coefficients in 
bold denote significance at 10% level or better.  Industry dummies are included in all regressions but 
results are not reported.  Reference country is the UK and reference industry is manufacturing.  
 
 
